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A BRIEF SUMMARY 
 
 
The Phenomenological Turn in Cognitive Neurosciences:  
 
From Francisco Varela to Shaun Gallagher 
 
 
The thesis that we propose to defend here is entitled The phenomenological 
turn in cognitive neurosciences: from Francisco Varela to Shaun Gallagher. This 
subject is highly relevant and innovative because, as noted Edmund Husserl 
([1911] 2009: 8), we are persuaded –even in our 21st century– that “it is still 
being discussed until today in what relation is philosophy with the sciences 
of nature and spirit”. This discussion has been rekindled, again and again, 
in the last decades with regard to natural sciences and cognitive 
(neuro)sciences1. In this thesis, we wanted to contrast the hypotheses that 
drove our research: one general hypothesis and three special ones in 
derivation of the first one. Hence, we opted to formulate them as follows: 
 
• General Hypothesis (GH). There has been a phenomenological 
turn in cognitive (neuro)sciences, which was originally led by 
Francisco J. Varela and continued, after him, by Shaun 
Gallagher. 
 
o First Special Hypothesis (SH1). The above 
phenomenological turn is reaction and product of 
some particular assumptions pertaining to a 
naturalization project, which we intend to 
investigate.  
                                                
1 When writing “cognitive (neuro) sciences”, we refer to cognitive sciences in general, as 
well as to cognitive neurosciences, that is, in their specification among the different 
disciplines of cognition. In our thesis we will separate the different terms, as long as we 
specially refer to each of them. 
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o Second Special Hypothesis (SH2). The above turn was 
originally promoted by the Chilean neurobiologist 
Francisco J. Varela in a determined intellectual and 
historical context. 
 
o Third Special Hypothesis (SH3). The above turn has 
been updated and ripened, without injury from other 
authors who claim a similar action, by the Irish-
American professor Shaun Gallagher in a determined 
intellectual and historical context.  
 
If, on the one hand, GH comprehends all the present doctoral research, 
SH1 belonged to Part I, SH2 to Part II, and, as it could not be otherwise, 
SH3 to Part III. But before continuing, let's explain why we titled our 
thesis of the already enunciated form. Thus, the proposed title of this book 
is composed of various elements, as diverse was our standpoint: 
"Phenomenological turn", "cognitive neurosciences", "Francisco Varela" 
and "Shaun Gallagher". The very presence of these elements showed that 
we were faced with a research aimed to build bridges and not trenches 
between the different fields of knowledge. There is no work in our field of 
study that is strictly parallel to our chosen theme and authors, which 
reinforced its originality. 
 
By "phenomenological turn", an original expression of ours, we were not 
willing to mean the positioning towards the mind or conscience as a 
problematic entity on the part of philosophy or the sciences of cognition, 
since it was something already done by authors like John Searle (1992 ), Ray 
S. Jackendoff (1987) or Owen Flanagan (1993), among others; but rather we 
denoted with it the exceptional turn towards phenomenology as a 
complementary method on the part, not of a qualified philosopher, but of 
a renowned neuroscientist with outstanding philosophical skills: Francisco 
J. Varela and his philosophical partner, Shaun Gallagher. They tried to step 
out “the relation between philosophy and empirical science [as] one-way 
 3 
enterprise [or] an application of ready-made concepts [where there is] no 
reciprocity, and there is no feedback. The application does not lead to a 
modification of the original analysis” (Zahavi 2009: 13).  
  
Varela and Gallagher, which didn’t miss the boat, were not obsessed to 
solve –as we don’t either– the entity of conscience, but getting, through an 
approach as inclusive as possible, a response to its problematicity. That 
said, we desired to pay our forces in this thesis to study this question in a 
systematic and historical way, since we noticed that the tangible and 
transversal character of this turn wasn’t previously enhanced with enough 
determination in contemporary philosophy and science. Our thesis, in 
addition to the introduction, conclusions and bibliography, houses three 
major parts in response to our three special hypotheses; doing such a thing 
always at the pace of the general phenomenological turn in cognitive 
(neuro)sciences that we resolved to investigate: 
 
 
As we can observe in the above ordered list, one can’t study any movement 
or turn, in philosophy or science, without first paying attention to the 
assumptions that guide it: in the case of the phenomenological turn in 
cognitive (neuro)sciences, these assumptions sprout from a naturalization 
ab initio, that is to say, in a previous notion of nature and a particular 
naturalizing action. Therefore, in Part I, we provided the basic lineaments 
of this naturalization in two chapters: a chapter for the reductionist 
naturalization of phenomenology (Chapter 1) and another one for the 
reductionist naturalization of this philosophia prima (Chapter 2).  
 
In Part II, stocked up with three chapters, we studied the Chilean 
neurobiologist Francisco J. Varela (Santiago 1946-Paris 2001), which was 
the principal agent of the phenomenological turn and whose thought we 
Part I: The assumptions of the phenomenological turn: Naturalization (SH1) 
Part II: The performance of the phenomenological turn: Francisco J. Varela (SH2) 
Part III: The continuation of the phenomenological turn: Shaun Gallagher (SH3) 
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didn’t hesitate to consider the main responsible for the performance of 
this shift in cognitive (neuro)sciences. Varela was, indeed, the creator of 
neurophenomenology, since he profiled it as a methodological remedy for 
the hard problem of consciousnes as a heuristic and pragmatic exploration 
of lived experience (Chapter 3). Neurophenomenology is then a 
transdiscipline of lived experience, which has a solid phenomenological 
affiliation (Chapter 4) and neurobiological basis (Chapter 5) that we 
meticulously analyzed in that portion of our thesis. There is no doubt that 
this second part is fundamental regarding our doctoral efforts: in this part 
are accurately compiled the central contents, for the turn was historically 
materialized and meant to remodel cognitive (neuro)sciences. Thanks to 
his foundational exertions, an empirically informed phenomenology was 
excelled, and, mutatis mutandis, we envisaged a “phenomenologically informed” 
(Gallagher 2006: 125) demarche in cognitive (neuro)sciences. Varela and 
Gallagher thought that this project was, colloquially speaking, the greatest 
thing since slide bread. Neurophenomenology gets the best of two worlds: 
empical science and phenomenology.  
 
To finalize our book, in Part III, a much shorter section that comprehends 
just chapter 5, we dwelled on how the phenomenological turn is being 
prolonged at present by Shaun Gallagher (Pennsylvania, 1948). The 
professor Memphis is the co-director of this thesis along with the Spanish 
philosopher Juan José Acero (Madrid, 1948). This last part is also a critical 
and a complementary moment to what Varela himself, prematurely 
deceased, could not undertake in his own neurophenomenology. Our 
thesis would be diminished if we wouldn’t say at least some synthetic and 
critical words about an essential author like Gallagher, who claims for a 
front-loaded phenomenology and even for a neurophenomenology of 
astronautics. We defined him, on the one hand, as a prodigious candidate 
to survey but also straighten out the Varelian approach. On the other hand, 
the methodology that we followed in this thesis was convenient with the 
trans-perspective that we opted for from the outset. Finally, this meant 
that our methodology was, at the same time, systematic and historical. 
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Moreover, both Varelian and Gallagherian turn demonstrated, each 
looking after his own, some characteristic transdisciplinary features. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
(ENGLISH ADAPTION) 
 
In order to culminate the labyrinth of what we have been studying, we will 
strive, finally, in the conclusions of the six chapters which solidify this work 
and end it in its entirety. It is enough to say that we have proposed to give 
our thesis a ternary order, perhaps in a more dialectical spiral than a linear 
path, so as to follow up and crumble the phenomenological turn in 
cognitive (neuro)sciences. When we used the word “turn”, this pointed out 
our insights toward some notion of movement, so that what turns itself 
changes in a certain way from one point to a new one, or to say it in a more 
embodied lexicon, from a particular posture to a new one. Thus, it has been 
possible for us to evaluate, as we established in the General Introduction, 
that this is a turn of motilities; which ply Francisco Varela’s early intuitions. 
Nevertheless, and to put it in a nutshell, the turn is still in transformation. 
In addition, this turn implies a visible mobilization, without previous 
historical milestones –which doesn’t mean that it can’t be reformed a 
futuro–, in two perimeters: (1) within cognitive (neuro)sciences and (2) 
within phenomenology. This dearth of the traditional isolations and the 
continuous questioning regarding all the assumptions, tensions and 
stubbornness of both disciplinary territories –in the interests of a 
transdisciplinary method– is what we wanted our readers to palpate with 
smoothness in this thesis. 
  
Thus things, we hope that it has been possible to verify that the 
phenomenological turn in cognitive (neuro)sciences is not something 
indistinct or at all encircled in a single author, or perhaps frosted in a 
unique thought. It would have been our awkwardness to have spoken only 
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on Varela, or, verbi gratia, on the latest trend in phenomenology that is 
present in its most current exponents like Gallagher et altri. We had a 
sweeping desire for systematicity and historicity from these research 
commencements. Therefore, the subtitle of our thesis exposes much of the 
idea of a motility turn, which now, after studying the subject painstakingly, 
we think that it stands out with more prominence: From Francisco Varela to 
Shaun Gallagher. The turn progresses from author to author, but it also 
oscillates and it’s reformable, without either of them retaining it. 
Sometimes we went, certainly and in the systematic and historical order of 
our thesis, from the Chilean neurobiologist to the Irish-American scholar, 
that is, from the South to the North of America, but we also returned to 
the intellectual persistence that Varela still preserves in the recent 
exploitation of neurophenomenology in other contexts –Shaun Gallagher 
is a great example of this– that stimulates our reflection again. However, it 
is of justice to indicate that, in addition to Varela or Gallagher, there are 
many other authors of serious importance which joined them, since neither 
of them worked alone: their contributions are mainly collective, as we read 
in their papers and books.  
 
Our preference for these two authors in the subtitle of the thesis is due to 
its clear dexterity of the phenomenological turn, although the are more 
authors which shadow them and also owe to them their leadership. In fact, 
when we studied Varela and Gallagher, we learned, in addition, from their 
fellows and partners. By electing the Chilean scientist and the Irish-
American philosopher, we didn’t wish to detract from their inspiring co-
authors. On the contrary, they served us to see what they get on credit. 
The works that best represent the turn –which both authors conducted by 
leading their own naturalization, performance and continuation of this 
enrolment– become part of community knowledge, as we seen in the 
quotations and final bibliography. Both authors –without prejudice to their 
limelight– are prototypes of the phenomenological turn as a community 
movement, that is to say, a mobilization in the scientific and research 
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community; since the best knowledge is often achieved in the cultural 
heritage of the communal ethos. 
 
We believe, therefore, that we made available abundant data and 
arguments to the reader, so that he or she might appreciate the 
effectiveness of our General Hypothesis (GH)2, which we faced under a 
non-reductionist naturalization –according to the First Special Hypothesis 
(SH1)–, which twisted this turn exemplified by Francisco J. Varela as its 
main forerunner –Second Special Hypothesis (SH2)–. But the turn receives 
its actualization by Shaun Gallagher, in conformity with the Third Special 
Hypothesis (SH3). For that reason and in the next three points, we bring 
in the following themes the conclusions that respond to each of these 
conjectural scenarios, which had been our starting point in the General 
Introduction. 
 
 
1. Which were the assumptions of the turn? 
 
In the First Part of our thesis, trying to respond to the SH13, we 
investigated the basic characterization of the phenomenological 
mobilization in cognitive (neuro)sciences, which supports the bases for its 
initiation and maintenance in the last two decades. We started this thesis 
with the “radical proposal”, which we uncovered in the light of Zahavi 
(2009: 14) in the General introduction. In this regard, we hope that the 
reader was able to interpret a certain dialectical proceeding from the 
antithetical to the thetical in our work, namely what is precisely the 
opposite to the phenomenological turn but, despite everything, it 
promotes its assumptions. We said that naturalization is some kind of 
action, as it seeks to translate this action into scientific research, and not 
simply doing a theoretical enterprise –naturalism grasped as an overview of 
                                                
2 “There has been a phenomenological turn in cognitive (neuro)sciences, which was 
originally led by Francisco J. Varela and continued, after him, by Shaun Gallagher”. 
3 “The above phenomenological turn is reaction and product of some particular 
assumptions pertaining to a naturalization project, which we intend to investigate”. 
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reality–. Driving a broader nature is not the same as its ideological scratch, 
although sometimes they are identified in practice. 
 
Thus, and in the first chapter, dedicated to reductionist naturalization, we 
studied how, at the furthest point of the phenomenological turn here 
examined, it constituted without a doubt an armoury of unknowns and 
setbacks that was, later, the object of an obsessive resolution on the part 
of the representatives of this ideological project. We could indicate this in 
other more expressive clauses. At least for now, it’s useful –in a very 
didactic way– the distinction in social psychology, according to degrees of 
lesser to greater hostility, between stereotype, prejudice and discrimination 
(Cf. Fiske 2000). Reductionist naturalists often have a stereotype of that 
kind phenomenology that was first unveiled by Husserl, attributing to that 
a relegated and secondary functionality with respect to natural sciences, or 
simply –and this is where the prejudice is appearing– a negative and 
paradoxical mistreatment. The prejudice suggests, in effect, a disdainful 
estimation, which is not very often detectable in the research group 
characterizations: someone can stereotype Husserlian phenomenology by 
saying that phenomenologists tend to use, for instance, an unserviceable 
manner of speaking. But one can do such a thing without prejudging 
phenomenology in a reductionist way. They are two very different things. 
 
However, the most unfortunate of this démarche is not other than 
discrimination, that is, the negative feat in conducting the research 
community –the researcher working alone is not exempted from this– 
against phenomenology. We observed such a thing in the displacement of 
higher-order tasks towards sensory perception (Dretske), or in the 
substitution of classical phenomenology for a trifling 
heterophenomenology led to a paroxysm (Dennett); as well as in a 
neurophenomenology famished in the subpersonal levels of an idolized ego 
(Metzinger). This reduction, which we mark as discriminatory, comes, as 
we noted, from a general naturalism (Chapter 1, 1.1.), which reverses the 
transcendental principle of the mental for the empirical one, being 
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enrolled in a descriptive commitment –little or nothing reflective– and 
turned into an executing arm of a reductionist way of doing empirical 
sciences. We indicate, precisely, the physicalism (Chapter 1, 1.2.), literally 
fought by Husserl (2008 [1936]: 301) in Krisis as a “physicalism, in the 
distorted form of logical matematicism”. One might verify this 
reductionist propensity by discriminating between the plurality of reality 
levels that are determined in the mathematical structural level panorama; as 
well as in the form of determinants that yield their physical micro-
compositionality. 
 
In other words, and instead of the phenomenological turn which goes 
towards a major experiential and experimental unities of vital complexity 
–typically found in Maturana and Varela’s biological phenomenology that 
cut across Part II–, the turn –the anti-turn, to put it better– would lead 
both to the most abstract and to the smallest sections in the physicalist 
material lattice, and then, in extenso, to the ontically lowest composition of 
autopoietic unities. The turn that attests this thesis strappingly disobeys 
the twilight of complex reasoning, for it is a good example of the kind of 
phenomenology that Husserl imploded in the core of philosophy, the same 
thing that Varela di in cognitive neurosciences (with or without brackets). 
Dretske, Dennett and Metzinger did well-defined reductionist anti-
phenomenological attempts that were expected to damage 
phenomenology in its Husserlian silhouette and in other versions pooled 
with this one. In fact, the chosen trio renders their own phenomenological 
re-edition, moving from prejudice to discrimination and showing a close or 
distant pairing with respect to Husserl. The actions glimpsed in the three 
authors that we proposed were prejudicial and harmful to this, but they are 
not the only ones in making this so far. We don’t vacillate to state that 
they are exemplary specimens of the onslaught that reduces 
phenomenology to the reductionist memoranda. According to Dretske’s 
transparent phenomenology (Chapter 1, 2.1.), phenomenologizing is equivalent 
to phenomenal introspection -not phenomenological analysis- and 
introspection is eminently built upon sensory properties, displacing 
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superior cognitive functions to representational and external ones. 
However, we criticized that sensory concretion of complex cognition 
doesn’t disable its structuring complexity. Fairly, this concretion supplies 
this structuring modularity and procurs to swap its functionality. 
 
In Dennett's heterophenomenology (Chapter 1, 2.2), the partiality of 
Husserlian phenomenology was rejected because, even then, it postulated 
a privileged access to pure consciousness. However, the antidote of this 
philosopher was a phony neutrality and objectivity, by which just a 
physicalist view could be the best scientific way to strike down a classic 
phenomenological subjectivism and replaced it in this way with a narrative 
interpretation made through third-person scientific reports. But Dennett, 
who had the materialist eliminativist doormat, didn’t come up with the 
obstacles that he faced, notably when subjects intended to eliminate their 
own and other's subjectivity through their private subjective stance. The 
result of this was a fiction cutted off from Husserlian phenomenology, that 
is to say, nothing but an enterprise debased at the root by the scientistic 
ideology (an impossible narrative which was very similar to the old 
phenomenology that Dennett was trying to beat). For this purpose, the 
Varelian phenomenological turn had to take into account, in two ways, the 
limitations of both subjective and objective perspectives, but at any case –
as we surprisingly read in Dennett– changing one for the other or 
eliminating a problem to find another worse one. 
 
The other exponent of the trio that we proposed was Thomas Metzinger 
(Chapter 1, 2.3.), to whom we don’t hesitate to consider as the most 
moderate of the three cited philosophers, although not less adventurous in 
this regard. Metzinger resisted a phenomenology of the ego and 
intentionality in order to accommodate in its place a self-model 
neurophenomenology focused on attention. Therefore, the author rejected 
Dennet’s avoidance of the subject as an entity, which ultimately fell prey 
to the subjectivist deceit he sought to renounce in Dretskean transparency. 
Remaining in simple attention, Metzinger snapped that 
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neurophenomenology was unavailable – “entirely inaccessible from the 
first-person perspective”, Metzinger (2003: 145). )– in order to have access 
to subpersonal levels. We appealed then to the greater moderation of this 
author, because he didn’t exclude certain availabilities to subjective 
attention, although we considered as inadmissible and vague his 
antagonism between Husserlian phenomenology and 
neurophenomenology —in fact, he dind’t go beyond this opposition 
(Chapter 1. 2.3.1.). It’s a fact, as it’s discernible from the whole of this book, 
that one of the most outstanding landmarks of Francisco Varela was to 
establish, with exceptional meticulousness, a pragmatic methodology and 
a synchronic heuresis of the phenomenological method of subjective 
experience and its neurophysiological correlates, which –obviously– are not 
directly available to this experience. However, it seems to be a simple 
ideological idleness the fact that the mentioned authors didn’t directly 
consider some kind of utility about a phenomenological self-examination. 
Everything depended, then, on the terrain and the routes that had been 
previously travelled, consisting of –if we rework our sociological 
comparison– a sort of stereotypes, prejudices and discriminations that 
strongly smeared the accounts and belief system of the research group.  
 
Therefore, in the second chapter, dealing with non-reductionist 
naturalization, the disagreeing assumptions drastically changed, what 
altered the preceding prejudices and discriminations in such a way that 
phenomenology was no longer the most reductively impaired, although its 
classical inflations were reproved in favour of an open immediacy and 
commitment to a new naturalization wave. In the second chapter, the 
assumptions of the turn crystallized through a naturalization that we 
declared, without patches, as non-reductionist. We are ready to conclude 
here that reductionism can be baptized as the anti-turn, inasmuch as there’s 
no motility in the regressio ad infinitum towards a natural and ontically more 
insignificant action –not branded, for that reason, as unnecessary–. Not in 
vain we saw that Varela (1996b: VIII) confederated reductionism with the 
extreme right conservatism, whereas the methodological amplitude is what 
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he emphatically spurred and where tended, subsequently, the 
phenomenological turn. Thus, the non-reductionist movement lavished a 
greater manumission to complex thought and exempted this view from the 
sclerosis of an ideology unambiguously locked in natural micro-levels. 
Indeed, if there is an indelible mark in this turn, it’s because, at the same 
time as it naturalizes, it does so in a way that is not methodologically 
tribalist at all. That’s why this attitude is sneaked by phenomenologists and 
scientists. It’s, therefore, a new naturalization. 
 
Because of this, Gallagher (2012) disclosed his disagreement in thinking 
naturalism as a twin of reductionism, in which phenomenology was unfilled 
as a sort of revulsive –scientifically ignorant– about nature. The one who 
does phenomenology is not an outrageous of its integral human condition, 
so that the new naturalization –we insinuated an unideologized naturalism 
comprehended as a sort of actioning (accionamiento)– requests to expand 
without the customary sputtering outcomes the phenomenological 
method in addition to the scientific one. What mesmerized, then, our 
interest was the naturalization of phenomenology. On the one hand, the 
contending presumption of scientificity that was brandished by Husserlian 
phenomenology, and, on the one hand, the empirical pureness of cognitive 
(neuro)sciences, has been highly controversial in this book. It is not 
superfluous, either, that these sciences reconsider without stopping the 
uncrossable contours that are usually conferred to their epistemological 
demarcation, searching to delineate an impure approache that may be –we 
don’t fear to recognize it– more stimulating for their professional 
implementation. 
 
After the uprising of neurophenomenology in the intellectual scene in 
1996, we appreciated how Varela, along with other French researchers, 
took to the editorial board Naturalizing phenomenology (1999), a work in 
which they gave high-rise clues about how the new naturalization could be 
destined. Trailing this publication, we looked at the question of 
phenomenality (Chapter 2, 1), which, although it has been made invisible 
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in cognitive (neuro)sciences, had to be brought up in the new Varelian 
naturalization as a certain mode of actioning. How can we say something 
valuable, if we aspire to be true naturalizers, about what appears to 
conscience in its states and events, without at least mentioning –if not 
trying to satisfy– the problem of its radical appearance? Phenomenology is 
suitable for sciences because, in fact, it defies us not to turn our backs on 
this problem, and, thanks to it, to be able to reformulate the question 
about the phenomenality of phenomena. The affirmation that the mind is not 
a more or less complicated machine, but a phenomenal mind, that is, an 
experienced mind in its radical phenomenal power –not only for predicting 
or expounding innate phenomena, but for examining every new conscious 
appearance– is an issue that phenomenologists have been reviewing in a 
very close and flattering tactic. In chapter two, we sighted that 
phenomenality is at the mercy of all subjectivity (Cf. Roy et al., 1999: 10). 
 
But, having concern for our thesis, we still need to know if phenomenality 
is the same as intentionality. We think that this hasn’t been the central 
theme of our work but, nevertheless, we will have it very present in future 
publications. For now, we think, modestly, that if conscious mind tends 
towards anything it is because it consists, primordially and radically, of a 
power for it, which is seen in its irreducible background. But intentionality, 
the conscious faculty of appropriating any object, doesn’t float in a vacuum 
without some kind of greater and permitting integration quality 
concerning any conscious activity: this is, straight out, what we called 
phenomenality. Perhaps intentionality is the name that receives 
phenomenality in its appropriation of intentiones. It would fit, especially in 
the phenomenologies of the flesh that are currently in vogue, to reflect 
about a non-intentional phenomenality. Are they transposable?  
 
Nonetheless, any attempt to explain phenomenality in an absolute fashion 
by the means of its linguistic and objective derivatives, nor the 
neurophysiological correlates –not separated and encapsulated before of 
the mental, but concomitant to this power- is unjustifiable from the 
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phenomenological seriousness. This would not rescind, by far, the problem 
of phenomenality. In the non-reductionist naturalizers this phenomenality 
was natural, although it wasn’t possible to empirise or quantify it, once and 
for all, in the state of research. Actually, the new naturalization of 
phenomenology doesn’t imply the emptying of the width and the natural 
complexity of the living organisms —this is not much less of the conscious 
living organism which constitutes the human being. One can’t speak, as we 
read in Varela, of phenomenality, apart from the enactive autopoietic 
systems, nor in a way that is stuck into these systems, as we discerned in 
Thompson’s (2007: 158) bacterial sample.  
 
But this didn’t drag us beyond deflationism or inflationism: the new 
naturalization challenged the qualia and the distinction between easy and 
difficult conscious problems, or even the extra ingredients in consciousness 
(Chapter 2, 1.1.), because, again, we had to plant the flag of discord between 
what was naturalizable with more affluence in a reductionist form of 
consciousness –presumably easy– and in its differing account. Chalmers, as 
we explained, alleged an extra ingredient, certainly in order to make us 
notice that the easy problems depends on the difficult ones, but this did 
nothing but gangrene with more viciousness the wound that divided 
materialists and spiritualists. Therefore, we were in favour of the fact that 
Husserl incessantly reiterated an anti-naturalism (Chapter 2, 2), doing such 
a thing against an anti-scientific or anti-natural position. It was rather an 
intellectual answer to the sectarian stance of the anti-turn to which we 
have been trying to respond in this book. This has been really the case, to 
such an extent that we wanted to distinguish, without hindrance, that the 
Austrian professor did not unreconciled, more than enough, pure conscience 
and empirical consciousness (Chapter 2, 2.1). All this was due to the fact 
that his phenomenological method was sought, precisely, to provide an 
eidetic and transcendental prevision of the empirical data and private 
mental experiences. 
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We want to recognize, in addition to these conclusions, that it hasn’t been 
very comfortable for us to characterize the proposed naturalization. Thus, 
we pictured it as a transcendental re-ordering of ontologies (Chapter 2, 3.), 
since the naturalization twinned with hard natural sciences became 
obsolete, in comparison with that new version that is currently 
overthrowing the arbitrary border lines of these disciplines and re-ordering 
in the same transcendental horizon the different sciences–the regional 
ontologies (regionalen Ontologien) subsidized by Husserl–. We are staunchly 
studying a variety of portions of the real from a trandisciplinary 
methodology. Accordingly, we emphasized the sourcing (fontanal) 
transcendental feature. In another expressive metaphor, we maintained 
that it is not advisable to cut the umbilical cord between the donor (donans) 
and the donation (donation) in the same lived experience. 
 
The transcendental phenomenology, in a very different endorsement of 
neo-Kantianism, was linked from the beginning with experimental and 
eidetic psychology; as soon as a quantification and description (Chapter 2. 
3.1.) –always in the making– of that experience was permissible. This 
wedded the new naturalization, although under the clear condition of not 
coveting again the unilateral reductionism, with the a more integrating 
methodological heuresis. Under no circumstances, therefore, the 
mathematization or fisicalization of transcendental experience relieved or 
diminished its transcendentality, but, according to the new naturalization, 
some particular methodological treatments were encouraged to discover 
their mutual reference –and also paucity– by facing the same 
phenomenological horizon. 
 
The quality of this horizon –transcendentality– was a genuine broadening 
of the concept and the experience of nature (Chapter 2, 3.2.). The “pheno-
physics” (Roy et al., 1999: 55) could be erratic, if it would be sculpted as a 
reductionist one-dimensional mathematization and physicalization of 
Human being’s experience. We offered clear examples in this thesis in 
favour of the methodological unity (transdisciplinarity, as we called it in 
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Chapter 3) among the diversity of methodologies belonging to different 
disciplines. This diversity, indeed, provided us with the transcendental 
approach of phenomenology. Transcendentality is what validated the new 
naturalization descriptive commitment, but also its limitations. In effect, 
transcendentality was revealed to us in the shape of both an impulse and a 
limit, because it validated the same phenomenality and sended us back to 
the call (Ruf) of being –in agreement with the quoted Heideggerian term–, 
forwarding us to what is still pre-attributively and pre-categorialy 
undisclosed in our lived experience. 
 
Without earnest pretensions, we hope that the reader has perceived that 
this transcendentality can undoubtedly help phenomenology and sciences 
to agree on a mitigated biocentrism –of an irreducible bio-oriented experience, 
we prefer–, in which the phenomenological self may not be a bloodless 
puppet, determined in all its extremities by a life assumed in the most 
ethereal way. Perhaps this experimental and experiential biocentrism 
would be more radical than the relegation or trivialization of experience 
that worships an external life totem, wholly set apart from the same 
conscious and organic enaction of the body.  
 
 
2. How the performance of the turn was developed?  
 
In Part II we expounded on SH24 –we dealt there with the performance of 
the phenomenological turn in cognitive (neuro)sciences–, the reader will 
have found the most properly Varelian chapters among those that make 
up our own systematization. However, this great section doesn’t go alone. 
Underneath the assumptions shell of Part I corpus, we clarified what type 
of non-reductionist naturalization is envisaged and sparked by the 
intellectual endeavour of Francisco J. Varela throughout his 
neurophenomenology and his own research on cognitive (neuro)sciences. 
                                                
4 “The above turn was originally promoted by the Chilean neurobiologist Francisco J. 
Varela in a determined intellectual and historical context”. 
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It was possible to distinguish that the new naturalization enlarged 
philosopher’s and scientist’s fields of study, thanks to the 
neurophenomenological approach; so that we could’t minimally 
understand the Chilean neurobiologist’s ideas without it. We think that 
Varela's thought is, all at once, innovative and ground-breaking, for he 
displayed a very eclectic vision of philosophy of mind, cognitive 
(neuro)sciences, and, of course, of phenomenology as such.  
 
As we wrote in the General Introduction, the proposal studied here is not 
that of a meek adherent of scientific questions but of one of the most 
relevant neuroscientists of the contemporary era, who thought and worked 
on these questions. Varela was introduced to us as the spokesman of the 
exhaustion, and even the bankruptcy of neuroscientist unilateralism and 
reductionism, even though he was formed at Harvard University had 
expressly bragged from this which in the 70s. The primary cry that 
dramatizes Varela's neurophenomenology has been very audible for us 
within the very heart of cognitive (neuro)sciences, claiming a much more 
naturalized assignment than the partial one in this field. It will not have 
been too obtuse to see that the three chapters of Part II have been 
arranged in such a way that one can acquire, as soon as one surveys them, 
an intellection as solid as possible of the Varelian turn. We started Part II, 
notably chapter 3, from lived experience, letting us to coach the reader, 
through it, in neurophenomenology; which presumed a certain heraldry in 
classical phenomenology (Chapter 4.) and, as could not be otherwise, in 
the cognitive (neuro)sciences historiography (Chapter 5.). 
 
In the third chapter, then, we coloured neurophenomenology as a 
methodological exploration of lived experience, that is, as a new 
transdisciplinary approach that tries to get a handle on the explanatory gap 
and the hard problem of conscience –this one gave painful headaches to 
philosophers of mind during the 80s and 90s—. In any case, the remedy 
offered by Varela was methodological and not at all ontological, that is, he 
was not interested in the being of consciousness –according to the age-old 
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science of ens inquantum ens–, but to find a way to nearing it and take it into 
account scientifically. The neurobiologist attempted to marry “modern 
cognitive science and a [trans]disciplined approach to human experience, 
thus placing myself in the lineage of the continental tradition of 
phenomenology” (Varela, 1996a: 330). Therefore, to scrutinize the being of 
experience and stretch it its prevalence would signify to judge experience, 
by appealing to a more general reality –the esse of ens– and without knowing 
yet what this experience of oneself and in oneself can give. Hence, in the 
same vein of the Chilean scientist, the experience did not worry him as an 
entity but as a subjective activity. He drew up neurophenomenology as a 
practice (pratique de l’experience), in incontestable debt to French 
phenomenologist Natalie Depraz, who greatly aroused Varela's 
phenomenological conversion. 
 
In consequence, a general epistemological theory doesn’t have to be 
applied to lived experience (expérience vécue) (Chapter 3, 1), in the same 
manner that ontology was rejected by Varelian senoir hermeneia. 
Neurophenomenology, which is interpretive and pragmatic, is based on 
the irreducible lived experience, and from this starting point, one can 
empirically describe its own vital behaviour in the irreducible integrity of 
the human organism (Chap 3, 1.1.). We agreed, in that sense, that there was 
an analogy between the irreducibility of lived experience and the biological 
irreducibility, although it was through the first one that the second aspect 
makes sense. Both are needed sure enough for Varela didn’t make an 
epistemology or an isolated biology lost in its own twists: the autopoietic 
systemic unities are not conceptual but real in their components, being 
lived in its structure by the self. But this is not the cellular autopoietism 
featured by Thompson (2007): it is very common to award these radical 
positions of bacterium’s experience to the Chilean neuroscientist.  
 
Varela, an intellectual of maximum score, evolved from his autopoietic and 
phenomenological biology to a phenomenology of a greater qualitative 
scope, that is, of the human being as a living experiencer and experimenter. 
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The human being, who receives by derivation the cellular autopoiesis —the 
self-organization, self-realization and self-production of the living—, is 
experienced and experimented as an irreducible system of multiple 
subsystems. That is, since irreducibility is not synonymous with scientific 
inexplicativity, it infers a very complexity that requires us to appreciate 
biological phenomenology –in the case of the living being’s irreducibility– 
and neurophenomenology –if we give credit to the analogous irreducibility 
of lived experience–. If this experience is the first matter that affairs us, it 
was very rightful that we asked ourselves, considering the 
deconstructionist critique, if our experience could be explored in any way 
(Chapter 3, 2.). Our response was of course affirmative, knowing that all 
self-examination is a linguistically configured interpretation, but also, 
socially, culturally and historically aligned with our circumstantial life. 
 
We resolved, then, that neurophenomenology tries to explore lived 
experience in its circumstantial and worldly plot, so that it can be counted 
among first-person methodologies (Chapter 3, 3.), although it should not 
be confused with: (1) a “privileged access” (Varela & Shear, 1999: 2), (2) with 
a “just-take-a-look attitude” (Varela and Shear 1999: Ibid.), or (3) with a 
secluded description from a first-person point of view. In fact, this 
neurophenomenology, which is included in first-person methods, is 
distinguished from the introspective method, that is, from the pure 
Husserlian phenomenology; and from the meditative and the mindfulness 
practices. Among other alreadt reputable points, Neurophenomenology 
configures a transdisciplinary approach in the form of “an integrated or 
global perspective on mind where neither experience nor external 
mechanisms have the final word” (Varela & Shear, 1999: Ibid.). Unlike the 
introspective method (Chapter 3, 3.2.), neurophenomenology considers 
subjective experience with regards to motions and bodily modifications 
during the enaction of the soma as a lived whole.  
 
In contrast to the phenomenological method (Chapter. 3.,3.3.) and 
although we saw it more thoroughly in the fourth chapter, 
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neurophenomenology revealed its rejection of empiricism and 
psychologism, as well as its tenacious and dubious proceeding before any 
not satisfactorily contrasted affirmation; taking into account a 
groundwork inquiry that is always in scrutiny. Classical phenomenology 
considered, in honour of its disciplinary purpose, everything that 
experience could offer, by the means of intuiting and naming its 
phenomena and reflecting on them; as well as cordoning its conscious 
ingredients through the epojé and the phenomenological Reduktion. 
Phenomenology, indeed, executes a refinement of the accessory subjective 
characters. However, we conclude that neurophenomenology requires an 
embedded, extended, embodied and ecological profiling, which should 
have in particular a careful appreciation of the techniques, methods and 
results of cognitive (neuro)sciences and other auxiliary disciplines; helping 
to phenomenologize those neurophysiological counterparts originally 
vetoed by Husserl's pure analysis. 
 
As far as it is concerned, the phenomenological turn is not anarchic but, as 
we have been baring in this thesis, it has clear principles and guidelines. 
We established, in effect, that in the programmatic article 
“Neurophenomenology”, Varela (1996a) raised the four moments of the 
Husserlian epojé and the reduction that assisted for his novel approach 
(Chapter 3, 3.3.1.), in terms of an attitude that begins by bracketing all the 
considerations of the world that fog up our experience in the most sharped 
way. The conclusiveness of this was gaining a conspicuous and 
unideologized outlook, demanding us to expose, in the context of 
neuroscientific protocols, both the variability and invariability of what we 
experience and how we experience. We can’t dismiss moreover its 
pragmatic, intuitive and intersubjective training, in favour of the stability 
of the skills trained in second-person by an expert. However, this doesn’t 
stop us from advising the reader that Varela, probably due to his premature 
death, didn’t deepen how to get a second-person training (Cf. Olivares et 
al., 2015); nor did he take advantage of the expertise in 
neurophenomenological protocols designed for subjects, less or nothing 
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prepared for reflective thinking –because of educational lacunae or natural 
diversity–. We also conclude here that Varela didn’t include the cases in 
which the pathological indisposed subjects were not able to possess the 
minimum capacities to take part into neurophenomenological 
experiments. 
 
But, in addition to this very descriptive feature, we immersed ourselves in 
Varela's phenomenological filiation. In the fourth chapter, adjusted to the 
phenomenological inheritance of Varelian turn, we wanted to show the 
continuities and discontinuities in the extensive up-to-date of Husserl’s 
method. Varela spelled out Husserl’s phenomenology and that kind of self-
examination of other eminent phenomenologists (like Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty), in order “to project phenomenological description back 
within natural attitude” (Varela, 1997a: 368) and without acquiescing 
therefore to the caricature of this attitude as a reductionist foolishness. 
Similarly, the Chilean researcher gave a lug of ears to the mere 
neuroscientification of experience, since the formal and material object of 
phenomenology had been, for years, the subjective activity in its noematic 
and hyletic broadening. In neurophenomenology –we should estimate– 
this scenery has tremendously changed, because the formal object quo 
belongs to cognitive (neuro)sciences in a transdisciplination with 
phenomenology, while the material object quod fit for the material data of 
these sciences, as long as they are synchronized with its phenomenological 
donation. Of course, neuroscientists can continue working in the 
autonomy of their disciplines and phenomenologists can do their own by 
using their accustomed rational musings. Nevertheless, they will not be less 
professional if they decide to act in the role of neurophenomenologists. 
What Varela questioned was, simply, the transdisciplinary quality of their 
intellectual achievements. We affirmed, in fact, that the 
phenomenological turn is not compulsory for neuroscientists, nor is the 
neuroscientific turn for phenomenologists. One should recognize that if 
both look to each other's work, this can be more productive and fitting 
than an impassable methodological tribalism. It’s a better inkling to 
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integrate different perspectives of the same nature in the same 
transdisciplinary methodology, without protecting oneself in just one 
aspect of them. 
 
In this way, we assume that phenomenology was an recurring enclave of 
interest (Chapter 4, 1) for Varela as a neurobiologist so that to craft his 
new transdisciplinary and pragmatic approach. In his new 
neurophenomenology, the Chilean man trumpeted “the centrality of 
phenomenology” (Varela, 1997a: 359), inasmuch as he enormously 
corrected the subjectivism of psychology, the objectivism of science and 
the dogmatism when experimenting and investigating reality in a scientific 
kaleidoscope. Phenomenology has been one of the most integrative 
methods that has been hitherto established, since it has not clung to the 
single reine Ich that goes back to Kant and the Cartesian cogito.  In 
accordance to Husserl, indeed, noesis and noema allow us to constitute the 
world in its materiality –in its hyle–, doing so in a way other than a guileless 
subject/object dualism. In this situation, there can be a natural 
exhaustiveness in neurophenomenology, without undoing the subjective 
structures of the living system that experiences as a human. Subsequently, 
what Varela discussed was how to accommodate, without ontological 
leaps, an unprecedented methodological hybridization which could permit 
us to open the gates to a naturalized phenomenology and, on its behalf, to 
a more leading role of phenomenology-friendly cognitive (neuro)sciences. 
That’s why we take profit of this opportunity to sustain that it’s feasible 
not only a naturalization of phenomenology but a phenomenologization of 
nature (Chapter 4, 1.1.), by the means of a double circulation in which 
naturalization and phenomenology undergo, without respite, to the 
criticism and improvement of each of these actions. 
 
It was a fact, then, that the importance that Varela conferred to 
phenomenology made him penetrate Husserl's thought, rediscovering and 
updating it with high efficiency (Chapter 4, 2.). In a time of maximum 
splendour in his own career, Edmund Husserl wanted to reconcile the 
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Cartesian fracture, without completely complaining about Cartesianism, 
for it was based on the direct and inescapable evidence of the cogito. For 
his part, the Chilean neurobiologist studied the younger Husserl of Ideen, 
where he meant to “purely reflect on consciousness and to discern its main 
structures” (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1993: 44), both in the essences 
intuition and in transcendental reduction. However, Varela was more 
spirited than the eidetizing Husserl, studying how to overcome the 
mentalist deficiencies of his work (Chapter 4, 2.1.) in the transition that 
exists between Ideen and Krisis; instead of his “purely mental and accessible 
[entrance] to conscience in an abstract philosophical introspection act” 
(Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1993: 45). 
 
Husserl discovered the lifeworld as the “subsoil” of “multiple pre-logical 
validities” (Husserl, [1936] 2008: 166), as we read in Krisis, and which 
comprises the Körper-Leib intertwine of all conscious activity. For that 
reason, neurophenomenology restored corporality and embodied 
rationality in science (Chapter 4, 3.). There is only a single 
phenomenological body –lived and living– which correspond to the 
dialectical and multiple unity (ego-corpus) that withstands 
neurophenomenology. According to his, Varela didn’t stop putting his own 
signature on it, because his neurophenomenology was even more radical 
than the theoretical reflection on matured Husserl’s lifeworld in Krisis and 
who never gave up its Cartesianism (Chapter 4, 2.2.). 
Neurophenomenology is not a lagging enterprise or some kind of a 
posteriori theorizing about life. Recalling our methodological principle, it 
is the experiential and experimental phenomenological and scientific study 
of human life while we experience in lifeworld. Varela was shrewder than 
Husserl, attributing to the phenomenological tradition the most cutting-
edge investigations and procedures pushing cognitive (neuro)sciences, a 
fact which would certainly have been anachronistic in the Austrian 
philosopher. 
 
 24 
It goes without saying that Husserl is considered as one of the most 
prominent phenomenologists in his role of founder of this method of 
consciousness. This very distinction shouldn’t lead us to think that his 
disciples may be avoided in our investigation. We highlighted, thus, both 
the surfacing and the overcoming of post-Husserlianism, as Varela put it 
(Chapter 4, 3.1.), referring in particular to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. 
Both philosophers, as the neuroscientist praised, “underlined a pragmatic 
and embodied context of human experience, but in a purely theoretical 
way” (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1993: Ibid.). This was noticeable in 
Heidegger, who created a Dasein’s ontological and existential analytic, but 
not –this was what Varela uncorked– a transdiscipline of lived experience 
in its immediacy and more direct evidence and self-interpretation in the 
concomitant functioning of the body. For his part, Merleau-Ponty was 
academically obliged, like no previous phenomenologist, to the treatment 
of embodiment at the sight of science –this was a key influence in Varela–
, but keeping the distant disposition in relation to abstraction. On the 
contrary, Varela –and Gallagher even more– proposed to bring 
phenomenology to scientific experiments. Because of this, his 
neurophenomenology was pugnacious but also coupled with 
postmodernity. It was coupled with this transdiscipline by questioning the 
solitary paradigm of consciousness and the instrumentalist-objectivist 
rationality. It was pugnacious given that Varela’s neurophenomenological 
remedy was not envisioned in the shape of a resignation of scientific and 
methodological meticulousness.  
 
Having said this, neurophenomenology is not, as in the vulgarization of 
psychoanalysis (Chapter 4, 3.2.), a symbolic and subjectivist study –in 
second-person– of a subject’s fluctuation of experiences, in such a way that, 
oddly enough, it’s narrated in a subjectivist report (curiously from the first-
person point of view). On the contrary, we showed that Varela was a 
partisan of the rational systematization and neuroscientific empirization 
which are distinguishing features of his hybrid approach –even more 
inclusive than the psychological one– applied to lived experiences, 
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particularly those concerning “vigilant attention” (attention vigilante) 
(Chapter 4, 3.3). Varelian awareness, unlike mindfulness or Buddhist 
meditation, was waylaid in a more scientific manner, that is, as a cognitive 
prime act requiring a rigourous exploration of lived experience in its 
neurobehavioral phenomenality.  
 
In relation to this, we want to establish in these conclusions that the 
phenomenological turn, in addition to its fabled pedigree among 
continental phenomenologists, showed a well-known neurobiological 
lineage. In the fifth chapter we made advance both the second part of the 
thesis and the fourth chapter by consummating the other aspect –the 
scientific one– which categorizes the double term “neuro-
phenomenology”. It was, then, our determination to press ahead with the 
neurobiological bases of neurophenomenology, by comparing them with 
the intellectual biography of Varela as a scientist. We made a 
chronologization of his work which is, without hesitation, really novel 
since it connects neurophenomenology with the rest of the author's career 
as a biologist. After all, neurophenomenology –and the turn effects that 
curries our favour– are nothing but the result of the intuitions, requests 
and hard work of a neurobiologist who, without defecting from his career, 
pushed himself to the limit by dismantling the monodisciplinary bias in 
which he was institutionally educated. We dare to conclude, then, that 
neurophenomenology was developed in a triple biographical-systematic 
development in accordance with the three stages of the Chilean’s academic 
carreer and with the systematic and historical method of our doctoral 
work. In the first stage (Chapter 5, 1.), which goes from 1963 to 1986, the 
Varelian youth work together with Humberto Maturana converts the 
biology of cognition into a decorous foretaste of neurophenomenology, by 
welding the epistemological aspect with the biological one in the same 
cognitive activity. All this was done in a very uneven way with regards to 
those who limit themselves in a monodisciplinary way of doing the biology 
of the mind (Cf. Gazzaniga, Ivry & Mangun, 2014).  
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Being at the base of the experiential and experimental unum multiplex of 
neurophenomenology, which was always dialectical and multipl), Maturana 
and Varela thought that cognition could only be explained by cognition, 
which didn’t mean a cognitivist posture –rather a post-cognitivist one (Cf. 
Gomila & Calvo, 2008), as we pointed out elsewhere (Chapter 5, 2.1.)– nor 
a biologicism, since cognition is, seamless, embodied life –process– and 
cognitive life –function–. In other words, we can’t reduce, in the living 
autopoietic system, neither the process to the function, nor the function 
to the process. But, in Varela, this stage, along with his countryman 
Maturana, was emphatically empirical. Indeed, the empirical study of the 
nervous system and its brain required them to protect a biological 
phenomenology that had undesirably been enclosed in scientist frontiers 
(Chapter 5, 2.). Against all kind of brainism, the encephalon, unitarily 
diverse in its very hemispheres and areas, integrates a more complex system 
–such as the central and peripheral nervous system–, in unity and co-
dependency with remaining systems of the total human organism. The 
total autopoietic structure is, therefore, irreducible in its processes and 
operations; if we understand it as a structure with unity and autonomy in 
physical space and time. Consequently, it prevails the condition of 
systemic unity habitually accredited to the nervous system (Chapter 5, 2.2.). 
In this way, the structure preponderates to the internal, external or 
behavioural components –Varela was warning about the ruses that are 
related to that– of the nervous system, triggering (gatillando) the changes 
that its structure can accomplish depending on itself. 
 
We believe, moreover, that in this first stage prior to 
neurophenomenology we could read a very striking and vigorous 
experiential structuralism, which was –we can’t deny it– harshly different 
from the mathematizing and meta-experiential structuralism formalized in 
the last decades. This is then a material archetype of the experiential and 
experimental life –also susceptible of a post-cognitive and post-
connectivist accent– coming from an immanent structuralism related to 
the nervous system, just like it was expemplified through the neuron: in 
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Maturana and Varela we saw that structurality, systematicity and 
autopoietic quality occur in the neural micro-level, what maked us to 
derive this very quality to the entire nervous system.  
 
In addition to this, an operational closure and plasticity (Chapter 5, 2.4.) is 
repeated billions of times in the brain, by the means of their imperceptible 
neuronal autopoietic quality. This is an example of the fact that young 
neurobiologists didn’t reject localism, although they always appealed to 
larger scales of irreducible complexity. In fact, the nervous system 
operational closure marries more with the integrationist theories (Cf. 
Tononi, 2012), than with the connectionists versions. This statement 
unlocks young Varela’s irreducible choice for biological phenomenology 
and for his elder one in favour of a phenomenology guided by Husserl’s 
mind-sets. The nervous system ceases, then, to be seen as a mere machine 
that processes stimuli as a compound of pieces and physical-chemical 
elements, in order to treat it as a structuring and structured organism 
which is ductile and producting in a continuous operational change, not in 
despite of but thanks to its physical-chemical components. The nervous 
system is a self-producing/realizing whole (and not, at any case, a non-
partitive device) which take part in our lived embodied whole. 
 
We also reconnoitred –in the second stage (1986-1996)– Varela’s 
intellectual evolution, evolving from his renowned work as neurobiologist 
to the Parisian expertise in cognitive sciences as an interdisciplinary 
domain (Chapter 5, 3.). The scientist consecrated himself as a cartographer 
of cybernetic, cognitivist, emergentist and enactivist neuroscientific 
movements in order to leverage, in each one of them, the best skills for his 
own research plan. We saw how the Varela of those years, director of 
research and professor in Paris, was proposing a cognitive science 
concentrated on embodied action and consciousness, an issue which was 
undeniably missed in the beginnings of these sciences. In spite of 
everything, the Chilean neuroscientist had not yet formulated an original 
methodological remedy for the hard problem in that epoch, that is to say, 
 28 
an antidote minimally prescribable against the dysfunctions of those 
movements (whose rule of thung was working in separate segments of 
reality) with which the Chilean expert entered into dialogue.  
 
Varela imported the biological notions of co-emergence and self-
organization to the cognitive sciences palestra (Chapter 5, 3.1.), for which 
reason we could conclusively admit that he was one of the first –one can’t 
axiomatically affirm that the he was the first one– to introduce enaction in 
these sciences (Chapter 5, 3.2.). In fact, he recounted on different occasions 
having created with Maturana the neologism of autopoiesis. The enactive 
approach is, precisely, the recouped linkage between this second Varela 
and that of neurophenomenology, inasmuch as enaction means “a natural 
mutual fold/unfold of the organism and the world” (Varela 2000: 180) in 
the cognitive living system living and its immanent structures. If we look 
for a methodology to study experience, it should be as consonant as 
possible with the eclipse of dualisms that the Chilean neuroscientist saw 
confronting each other in neurocognitive methodologies. 
 
But we had to arrive at the birth of neurophenomenology itself. The third 
stage spanned since 1996 –the year of Varela's famous programmatic 
article– until 2001, the date of his fateful death. In this way, we affirmed 
that neurophenomenology was, in loyalty to the Chilean expressions, a 
middle way (via media) between cognitive and ontological extremisms 
(Chapters 5, 4), which Varela had already examined in the previous stages 
of his career: if the enaction was considered as an endogenous and 
exogenous activity, neurophenomenology could’nt be less consistent with 
the “between-two” (entre-deux) (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1993: 310) of 
the lived experience methodology that the Chilean expert was anxious to 
articulate. We can say, concluding this, that neurophenomenology is 
heuristic and experiential-experimental and not, primo sensu, ontological. 
Hence, we faced several fronts that authorized us to better surround the 
contours of neurophenomenology. Facing foundationalism (Chapter 5, 
4.1.), as it was undertaken by other specialists (Cf. Bitbol, 2012), Varela’s 
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program supports the lack of foundation (absence de fondement), since the 
presumption of incorrigibility of a predefined foundation could paralyze 
the consideration of the integral human experience. 
Neurophenomenology contributed, in contrast, to furnish an “interpretive 
framework” (Varela & Shear, 1999: 14) aimed to be as integrative as possible 
for the examination of lived experience, so that perhaps –we could 
conclude this accepting some contestation on the part of the reader– this 
framework could be the most inclusive one until the days that now take 
place.  
 
Facing the mind-brain identity theory (Chapter 5, 4.1.1.), Varela subscribed 
to mind-brain correlation thesis (Cf. Blutner, 2015), although he preferred 
the term “constraint” (constreñimiento) more than “correlation”, given that the 
irreducible unity of embodied lived experience. But what the Chilean 
neuroscientist didn’t sanctioned was the statist and fixist identification in 
terms of being: living reality is dynamic and we naturally experience it in 
that manner. Neither, as far as the phenomenalist fallacy was concerned, 
Varela didn’t accept the doctrine according to which from sensory 
experience one must derive with logical and scientific necessity the 
identity of being of subjective phenomena. If Varela were alive, we’d like 
to ask him if his youth emergentism –still latent in his enactivism– was 
truly free of the ontological identity: Does the emergence of qualitative 
states, processes and events of experience suppress causation in ordo 
essendi? Are we, again, before the emergentism of an unknown Humean 
causation; even if the products of conscious experience are, since they are 
living events, irreducible? Regardless of Varela’s answers, his enactivism 
was fixed in the autopoietic actions of the human living who experiences 
as an embodied unum multiplex, and not so much in a separative meta-
physical scope.  
 
For this reason, we proposed in an original way that Varela's attempt was, 
according to his characteristic enactivism, to outline an experiential and 
experimental monism or even a “matrix experientialism” (experiencialismo 
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matriz) (Mejía Fernández, 2017b: 188), quite different from Lakoff’s and 
Johnson’s ([1980] 2003) theoretical and semantic experimentalism. His 
proposal differed and alleviated ontological dualisms and reductionisms: 
the ego, according to the Chilean neurobiologist, is elusive because it folds 
and unfolds its intrinsic organicity in the extremities of his own embodied 
enactive lifeworld. We experience the unbreakable unity of us and life by 
the means of a subjective modus, although not in the manner of an 
ontological monism: living doesn’t mean ontologizing. Although we live 
them in a certain unity, the experience and the embodied-ecological 
lifeworld are irreducible to each other. Hence, it always remains a dialectic 
tension in the enactive experiential and experimental unum multiplex, given 
that it is lived as immanent and transcendent, what asks 
neurophenomenology for exploring this particular unum multiplex. 
 
Varela’s monism rejected radical ontological terms, in such a way that there 
was no identification nor separation in embodied lived experience. 
According to his, Varelian experiential and experimental monism is in 
close consonance with “radical embodiment” (Varela & Thompson, 2001: 
418), understood as a neurophenomenological non-identityist and non-
rupturist commitment in the neuroscientific domain (Cap. 5, 4.1.1.1.). The 
neuronal assembly, the phase-locking and the large-scale 
neurophenomenologically trained experiments concerning a 
“mentoscience” (Cfr. Northoff, 2014) which corroborates with great 
evidence the Varelian project. In the Chilean’s exceptional monism, 
experience and life cogenerates (coprincipates) and constrains each other 
in a radically embodied enaction, having no place for foundationalism, 
phenomenism, identityism or dualisms (Chapter 5, 4.1.1.2.). In fact, 
Francisco Varela’s notion of experience opened up, not just semantically 
but also in its quantitative-descriptive modelling, both the 
phenomenological subjective experience and the scientific empirical 
experience. Varela was not a semanticist but a vitalist and biocentrist of 
experience.  
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3. How the turn is being carried on today? 
 
We deem very suitable to affirm, in a strict and firm way –in derivation of 
the SH35 of our General Introduction–, that Part III can’t be short on our 
thesis. The phenomenological turn, activated by Francisco J. Varela, was 
not liquidated in his germinal efforts. The turn continues to be stirred 
today by very diverse intellectuals, among whom –already included in these 
doctoral pages– we designated with more effulgence Shaun Gallagher as 
one who, without undermining other authors’ category6, is the one who is 
forging one of the proposals, at the same time more prolonged and more 
critical, of the Varelian phenomenological turn. 
 
Just one year after the paper of the Chilean author in 1996, we documented 
that Gallagher (1997: 197) already supported, in the same journal in which 
the neurobiologist published, a “mutual enlightenment” of phenomenology 
and cognitive (neuro)sciences. Currently, the Irish-American thinker is 
one of the few in which one can find a neurophenomenology itself, which 
is judiciously allowable and insinuating, based on the non-reductionist 
naturalizing assumptions that we reported on Part I. This naturalization, 
as we stated in chapter six, was mutually identifiable in Varela and 
Gallagher; although the second one has been perceptibly influential in 
transferring the Varelian turn to new scientific fields, where the gatherings 
of neurophenomenology have been cautiously evaluated and pertinently 
qualified. The professor of the University of Memphis chooses this 
approach aspiring to a graduality and lessening of conscious experience, 
improving our acquaintance on body schematism. Gallagher is, in truth, a 
minimalist of the self who seeks a consistent phenomenological turn in 
cognitive (neuro)sciences. 
                                                
5 “The above turn has been updated and ripened, without injury from other authors who 
claim a similar action, by the Irish-American professor Shaun Gallagher, in a determined 
intellectual and historical context”.  
6 It would be very interesting to write a thesis only devoted to the continuation of the 
phenomenological turn in Thompson, Depraz, Di Paolo, Lutz, Cosmelli, Bitbol etc.; 
which would be quite different from ours, although it would obviously spring forth from 
our current systematic research. 
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We struggled that Gallagher is a critical post-Varelian, if by this we mean 
his commitment to naturalization, assumed in a much more integrating 
contract than the simple formal cooperation between phenomenology and 
science. The Irish-American’s post-Varelianism is, simultaneously, 
continuatio and innovatio by inclining the phenomenological turn towards 
sciences and revising obsolete postulates according to the present extent 
of these sciences. We can’t but pact that there will always be a before and 
an after from Varela’s contentions in reason, definitely, of the paradigmatic 
change of its neurophenomenological approach; which resurged in the 
incandescent crater of tenets, precomprehensions and methods of 
cognitive (neuro)sciences. 
 
Gallagher himself has confessed to us, almost before closing this thesis, 
that Varela has been one of his great masters: his non-reductionist 
boldness was, in reason of his time, context and repercussion, simply 
unequalled. His personality was not at all dull thanks to his willingness to 
take risks and act innovatively. Gallagher’s investigations, to which we gave 
the floor in Part III, have legitimized us in the idea that Varelian non-
reductionist and transdisciplinary serendipity continues to endure; 
although in current and reviewed explorations belonging to an even more 
radical enactivism that looks for enaction in cases of cognitive functional 
diversity or in convalescences afflicting the self. In the sixth chapter, as we 
gave voice to Gallagher, we dealt with the aspects both protracted and 
diverged in comparison with the Chilean neurobiologist. For this reason, 
we can finalize these conclusions by stipulating the seven points of that 
chapter. 
 
In the first point (Chapter 6, 1.), Gallagher, a significant and intimate 
Varela’s colleague, defends the turn towards phenomenology since it is a 
method for re-examining, socially and narratively, subjective phenomena; 
instead of having it as a doctrinal and dogmatic script that imposes what 
these phenomena must be. Phenomenology, as a method of/in experience, 
may respond to a “neo-pragmatism” (Gallagher & Miyahara, 2012: 499) 
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with a methodological and refining-embodied function in the social-
historical milieu: social cognition is hence much more accentuated in the 
Irish-American philosopher than in the Chilean neurobiologist, who was 
still very idiosyncratic in its methodology. For one and for another 
function, Gallagher appreaciates so much the epojé and the 
phenomenological reduction, as well as the intersubjective corroboration; 
since he confines them with the present paths pondering radical 
enactivism and social cognition. 
 
As we have brought to light in Varela, in the professor of the University of 
Memphis, transcendentality, in partibus infidelium, is a feature of the new 
naturalization in the same turn that he himself makes subsist (Chapter 6, 
1.2.): in addition to the importance of the empirical dimension, the 
transcendental dimension –always understood in an embodied way– “is 
more fundamental” (Gallagher, 2012b: 26); because it opens up new and 
more integrated perspectives testing the narrowness of phenomenology 
and science. But concerning new naturalization, transcendentality is not 
the synthesis of a pure self outside the lifeworld and the human flesh, nor 
a plan B when science fails; on the contrary, it sanctions us “to have a non-
reductionist science of the embodied mind” (Gallagher, 2010a: 21). 
Gallagher’s radical enactivism, which is “even more embodied” (Gallagher, 
2017b: 150) receives a greater socialization, ecologization and 
multidimention than the Varelian one. The radical enactivism of the Irish-
American scholar is so far away from a weak and strong embodied cognition –
which is still a repesentationalist cognition, according to his view–, as well 
as from a first and second wave reigning in extended cognition. Gallagher 
extols the irreducible and continuous multidimensionality of the cognitive 
system in the environment, through an affiliation to a third wave in these 
respects. Gallagher don’t want to bury the irreducibility of the experience 
that Varela snatched, but to presage us that, outside of the optimal health 
conditions of the subject, the experience might be lived as marginal, 
strange or dysphoric on case-by-case basis.  
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On the second point (Chapter 6, 2), apart from the Francisco Varela’s 
Husserlian uniqueness, we clinched that Maurice Merleau-Ponty has been 
the phenomenologist who has most marked Gallagher’s work program, 
pointing his research to a transdisciplinary redefinition of 
phenomenology(ies) and cognitive (neuro)sciences, provided that an 
uncluttered pluralistic eagerness could be guaranteed in his name. 
Following Merleau-Ponty’s exemplariness, it should be accomplished an 
“impure phenomenology” (Gallagher, 2010b: 184) supporting the plurality 
of phenomenologies which is impossible to gag in a single author and 
movement. In this great phenomenologist, it was possible to find “the 
facticity of the body, the medium that we are, and that puts us in-the-
world, [what is] central for understanding human existence” (Gallagher, 
2010b: 183) and, without a doubt, for an embodied phenomenology, along 
with the urgent knowledge of science in order to interpret what they 
elaborate: phenomenology and cognitive (neuro)sciences shed light in a 
reciprocal way. The "Cognitive Revolution" (Gallagher, 2012b: 16) has been 
joined by the embodied revolution, which we ferret out in Merleau-Ponty. 
However, as a caveat, this thinker made an indirect and retrospective 
phenomenology, which doesn’t reach the same quality and excellence of 
those who do neurophenomenology and front-loaded phenomenology in 
situ.  
 
In the third point (Chapter 6, 3.), we made accessible one of Gallagher's 
most relevant propositions: the body shaping of the mind. We 
remembered, then, his 2005 work How the body shapes the mind, which is in 
unequivocal contiguity with his declared proximity to Merleau-Ponty. A 
neurophenomenology of embodiment is only devisable through the body 
structuring the manoeuvres in and beneath experience. The body receives 
an active inscription in what we experience, upsetting –mainly– our affects 
prior to higher-order functions or mental events superimposed by the self 
in a reflective manner. Therefore, we haven’t been able to omit (Chapter 
6. 3.1.) the chief distinction between “body image” and “body schema” 
(Gallagher, 2005: 19-24): the first one constitutes the system of behaviours 
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that belongs to one's own body and which is pre-reflectively experienced; 
while the second one involves the sensorimotor capacities –experienced or 
not– of this same body. The difference between the two types of this 
distinction is not, in an unsophisticated way, between the conscious and 
the unconscious, the subjective and the objective, o even between the 
phenomenological or the scientific sides of the coin; since Gallagher 
maintains that body schema can be occasionally made conscious, although 
there are pathological cases –hemispatial neglect, agnosia, autotopagnosia, 
schizophrenia, etc.–, which frequently impede a higher experiential level. 
The distinction between body image and body schema is very advantageous 
in cases in which both flanks can’t be phenomenologically narrowed, for 
which reason it’s necessary to demand the succour of the 
psychopathological or neurological catalogue. Hence, it is noteworthy 
that, in Gallagher, we find the contention of a minimal self-awareness, 
understanding the self as a core pattern of the remaining embodied, 
extended, embedded and ecological patterns, which depends upon an 
ipseity that belongs to the nuclear self between all those dimensions. 
 
In the fourth point (Chapter 6, 4.), we gave an account of the Gallagher 
who is at the same time more and less Varelian. As the author stressed, 
neurophenomenology is a renowned contribution perfomed by Francisco 
J. Varela, which integrates –in a methodological tripod– (1) a 
phenomenologically analysable experience in first-person and the second-
person training of an expert, (2) the empirical and interpretive input of the 
theory of biological dynamic systems, and (3) the empirical 
experimentation of the biological correlates coming from third-person's 
point of view. This aims to generate new descriptive categories that should 
be as validated as possible between subjects and different approaches of 
cognitive (neuro)sciences. Despite his sweeping sustenance, Gallagher 
replies to Varela that experimental design has to be arranged with more 
precision and carefulness in those cases in which subjects’s training may be 
more puzzling and challenging –psychopathologies, cognitive functional 
diversity, brain injuries, communication and learning impairment, etc.–. In 
 36 
this way, something that we noted without fear in this author (Cf. 
Gallagher, [2005] 2007a) was that he delightfully differentiated 
neurophenomenology from neurophilosophy, since the first one doesn’t 
require an intertheoretical reduction –very conceivable, of course– that 
eliminates the psychological and subjective theories in favour of the 
scientific ones, by means of a stubborn conception of empirical sciences as 
tertium exclusum with respect to all subjective or humanistic approach. 
 
For the rest, Gallagher has established three counsels for Varela’s 
neurophenomenology: (1) the necessity to fashion a shared mental model, 
(2) an experimental design with high quality standards, (3) and the training 
improvement –when possible– in participants and experimenters. But not 
everything is darts against Varela. A nice sample of Gallagher’s proclivity 
towards neurophenomenology was his questioning of the synchronic 
decline of this approach, in a sort of indirect phenomenology similar to 
Merleau-Ponty or Braddock style (Chapter 6, 5.), since we unfortunately 
lost some of the previous tripod points. The shortage of coordination that 
auguries an indirect and retrospective phenomenology, or even a Dennet’s 
heterophenomenology based on a rarely neutral third-person 
methodology, remains a dualistic and reductionist execution that is 
admonished with forcefulness in the phenomenological turn that we’ve 
been drawning in our thesis. In the interest of instituting a more 
scientifically involved third proposal in design and direct adoption of the 
phenomenological philosophia prima, the professor of Memphis channelled 
his thinking towards a front-loaded phenomenology (Chapter 6, 6.), 
provided that this approach could be design in independence on subject’s 
cognitive capacities –skilled or not– to make phenomenology. This 
phenomenology, mounted without too many postponements, is typical of 
the professor of Memphis because it constitutes a “third vision" 
(Gallagher, 2003: 91) between neurophenomenology and indirect 
phenomenology. 
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In the case of not having a compensated experimental planning in 
subjects’s training or in empirical results, we are legitimized to “introduce 
phenomenology directly into experimental design”, so that we can drive, in 
the possibility of lacking the challenging Varelian conditions, to a 
"experimental design" (Gallagher, 2003: Ibid.). What we need, then, is to 
originate experimental protocols under phenomenological direct spotlight, 
which can be more specific and convenient in complex cases, where 
subject’s mental training ability can’t be sanctioned in high preparation 
levels. Here, then, we appreciate Gallagher’s great realism –obviously, not 
naïve– and his professed neo-pragmatism, showing a distinctive trait that 
uncovers the limits of neurophenomenology (Chapter 6, 6.1.). Prior to the 
already presumed subjective ability to participate in Varelian 
neurophenomenological experiments, the previous design of these 
experiments must be predisposed, in despite of not having the highest 
phenomenological requirements for trainers and participants that Varela 
claimed for in his neurophenomenology.  
 
Another illustration of Gallagher’s realism and neo-pragmatism is that he 
contemplates, like rara avis, the sense of agency and the sense of property 
in the application of front-loading phenomenology (Chapter 6, 6.2.), which 
we unfortunately didn’t find in Varela. Gallagher, as a consequence, don’t 
aspire to simplify things either. We indicated that, in the the sense of 
agency case, the pre-reflective –but in some case reflexive– experience of 
embodied action (the movement of the body and first-order aspects) have 
an original dwelling in the phenomenological turn critical continuation in 
which Shaun Gallagher is implicated. All this don’t come into collision, 
although it does vary according to each experimental case, with the I that 
is agent, to a greater or lesser extent and experience, of its motilities and 
somatic movements in the sense of property.  
 
Neither the sense of agency nor the ownership are blurred or relieved, in 
the unum multiplex of the living system, by the reflective attributions of 
agency and ownership (Cf. Stephens & Graham, 2000): the top-down and 
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the bottom-up explanations (Chapter 6, 6.3.) constitute complementary 
analysis levels in the same multidimensional enaction of the living system. 
Here one can realize Gallagher’s radical enactivism. Thus, the type of 
experience, whether high or primary, entails a type of phenomenological 
approach that should be in compliance with the experiential modality. In 
the case of the primary type, one can scientifically distinguish between the 
sense of property and that of agency, as seen in the Farrer & Frith (2001) 
experiment. Therefore, Gallagher (2003: 92) gave way to experiments 
where there is no allegedly place for a “higher order cognitive processes”. 
 
However, front-loading phenomenology is envisioned to cover, in a more 
concretized experimental design, the most heterogeneous, spontaneous 
and daily degrees of experience; so that we could play attention, in debt to 
its boundary and valid transcendentality, to the “imaginative variation” 
(Gallagher 2003: 93) and the experiential plurality of perspectives (Chapter 
6, 6.4.). This plurality, inculcated from the first-person point of view, adds 
other perspectives to the first and third-person stances, including both 
egocentric and allocentric ones. In the Irish-American professor, 
therefore, we are able to contemplate how cognitive (neuro)sciences can 
challenge phenomenology in cases in which, as Husserlian phenomenology 
set it, they concern pre-attributive and kinaesthetic field –in an 
experiential minimum—, and not for this reason being outside of all kinds 
of phenomenology. This pronouncement aids to modulate and adapt, more 
rigorously, the delineation of our research. In fact, Gallagher has been 
insisting that his front-loaded phenomenology, in contrast to the Valerian 
neurophenomenology, is basically thought and practiced for experimental 
design, being also valid for other animals than humans; as may be other 
homeothermic vertebrate amniotes with some kind of experience –as in 
the case of chimpanzees, for instance–.  
 
Finally, we want to put an end to our thesis by providing a clear example 
of Gallagher’s open-mindedness: he’s been coining a neurophenomenology 
of awe and wonder in the domain of astronautics (Chapters 6, 7), which 
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follows the trace of non-reductionist cognitive (neuro)sciences in an 
unique collective work (Cf. Gallagher’s et al. 2005). The authors combined, 
in that book, front-loading phenomenology –when designing complex 
experiments in a Virtual Space Lab (VSL)–, together with a 
neurophenomenology of the experiences of awe and wonder during the 
concurrent involvement of participants in the simulated space 
experiments. Gallagher, as if that were not enough, conducted monitored 
interviews with the participants just after their immersion in the simulator, 
in order to gain a more phenomenological intimacy in the experiences of 
awe and wonder that they there lived. This has allowed Gallagher and us 
to consecrate, trying to overcome the obstacles, the unthinkable 
applications and pragmatic transversalities of the phenomenological turn 
in much more disciplines than the neurocognitive ones. In short, we 
believe, honouring our General Hypothesis (GH), that the 
phenomenological turn in cognitive (neuro)sciences has been abundantly 
contrasted in this book. 
 
	
